Cross-border acquisitions acquisitions by Chinese enterprises: The benefits and disadvantages of political connections

被引:119
作者
Schweizer, Denis [1 ]
Walker, Thomas [1 ]
Zhang, Aoran [1 ]
机构
[1] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, 1450 Rue Guy, Montreal, PQ H3G 1M8, Canada
关键词
China; Cross-border M&As; Emerging markets; Multinational enterprises; Political connections; FOREIGN DIRECT-INVESTMENT; STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; BOARD; MANAGEMENT; COMPENSATION; FINANCE; OWNERSHIP; PAYMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.12.023
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper explores whether and how political connections affect the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A deal for Chinese publicly listed, but privately-owned enterprises (POEs) and the resulting firm performance. In line with our proposed political connection trade-off theory, we find that POEs with politically connected top managers are more likely to complete a cross-border M&A deal than POEs with no such connections, but that this comes at the cost of negative announcement returns and subsequent lower accounting performance. These findings support the idea that politically connected top managers engage in "political empire building" behavior at the cost of shareholders' wealth. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:63 / 85
页数:23
相关论文
共 94 条
[41]   Corporate governance and equity prices [J].
Gompers, P ;
Ishii, J ;
Metrick, A .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2003, 118 (01) :107-155
[42]   Internal finance and growth: Microeconometric evidence on Chinese firms [J].
Guariglia, Alessandra ;
Liu, Xiaoxuan ;
Song, Lina .
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2011, 96 (01) :79-94
[43]  
Hofstede G., 1980, CULTURAL CONSEQUENCE
[44]   Agency cost, top executives' overconfidence, and investment-cash flow sensitivity - Evidence from listed companies in China [J].
Huang, Wei ;
Jiang, Fuxiu ;
Liu, Zhibiao ;
Zhang, Min .
PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2011, 19 (03) :261-277
[45]   Chinese Private Firms' Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Does Firm Ownership and Size Matter? [J].
Huang, Xueli ;
Chi Renyong .
THUNDERBIRD INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS REVIEW, 2014, 56 (05) :393-406
[46]   Fraud, Enforcement Action, and the Role of Corporate Governance: Evidence from China [J].
Jia, Chunxin ;
Ding, Shujun ;
Li, Yuanshun ;
Wu, Zhenyu .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS, 2009, 90 (04) :561-576
[47]   Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective [J].
Jiang, Fuxiu ;
Kim, Kenneth A. .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2015, 32 :190-216
[48]   Appointments of outsiders as CEOs, state-owned enterprises, and firm performance: Evidence from China [J].
Jiang, Fuxiu ;
Huang, Jicheng ;
Kim, Kenneth A. .
PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2013, 23 :49-64
[49]   Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market [J].
Khwaja, AI ;
Mian, A .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2005, 120 (04) :1371-1411
[50]   Large shareholders, board independence, and minority shareholder rights: Evidence from Europe [J].
Kim, Kenneth A. ;
Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, P. ;
Nofsinger, John R. .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2007, 13 (05) :859-880