Agglomeration bonus in small and large local networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination

被引:45
作者
Banerjee, Simanti [1 ]
Kwasnica, Anthony M. [2 ]
Shortle, James S. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Stirling, Div Econ, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland
[2] Penn State Univ, Dept Risk Management, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[3] Penn State Univ, Dept Agr Econ Sociol & Educ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
关键词
Agglomeration Bonus; Coordination failure; Local networks; Experiments; STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY; HABITAT; INCENTIVES; FAILURE; GAMES; COMMUNICATION; FRAGMENTATION; CONVENTIONS; SELECTION; SERVICES;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.09.005
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a subsidy mechanism intended to induce adjacent landowners to coordinate environmental conservation activities. This paper explores the effects of landowner group size on spatial coordination under the AB in laboratory experiments where players are located on circular local networks. The experiments indicate a significant difference in patterns of coordination between groups. Additionally, global coordination on a single strategy is obtained in half of the groups and in the remaining half, both strategies exist giving rise to localized areas of coordinated land uses on the network. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:142 / 152
页数:11
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