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Expectation driven by update willingness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
被引:18
|作者:
Wang, Qiuling
[1
]
Jia, Danyang
[2
,3
]
机构:
[1] Changan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Dept Econ, Xian 710064, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Mech Engn, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[3] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Ctr OPT IMagery Anal & Learning OPTIMAL, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
基金:
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词:
Expectation;
Cooperation;
Update willingness;
Coevolution;
Social dilemma;
Heterogeneity;
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES;
DIVERSITY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.amc.2019.01.057
中图分类号:
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号:
070104 ;
摘要:
In real life, everyone is full of yearning and pursuit for future life. The difference between reality and ideals encourage people to constantly adjust the current state, so that they can better adapt to changes in the surrounding environment. Thus, we propose a spatial prisoner's dilemma game model where individuals have expectation towards the payoff obtained from nearest neighbors, and individuals can adaptively adjust their update willingness based on the satisfaction of income. Through numerical calculation, we find that different b values will have an appropriate aspiration level to promote cooperation. In addition, the results have an obvious phase transition phenomenon for individual's aspiration level on promoting cooperation. Moreover, only moderate aspiration level can promote the evolution of cooperative behavior, due to it can lead to the heterogeneous distribution of update willingness, which will be beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:174 / 179
页数:6
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