Policy watch - The marriage penalty

被引:43
作者
Alm, J [1 ]
Dickert-Conlin, S
Whittington, LA
机构
[1] Georgia State Univ, Sch Policy Studies, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
[2] Syracuse Univ, Syracuse, NY USA
[3] Georgetown Univ, Publ Policy Inst, Washington, DC USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.13.3.193
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Many government programs have implicit penalties or subsidies for marriage. For example, many couples pay higher income taxes when married than their combined tax liabilities as single filers, while many other couples receive a marriage subsidy because their joint taxes fall with marriage. Likewise, most low-income couples are eligible for higher welfare benefits if they are separated rather than married. This article discusses the marriage penalty, with a particular focus on tax and transfer programs. Why does it exist? Who faces it? To what extent does it affect marriage and labor market behavior? What tradeoffs are involved in reducing it?
引用
收藏
页码:193 / 204
页数:12
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