Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition

被引:18
作者
Becker, Johannes [2 ]
Fuest, Clemens [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Ctr Business Taxat, Said Business Sch, Oxford OX1 HP, England
[2] Univ Munster, Inst Publ Econ 1, D-48143 Munster, Germany
关键词
Corporate taxation; Profit shifting; Tax competition; REGIMES; HARMFUL;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.061
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow for some profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening of transfer pricing policies by high-tax countries may lead to more aggressive tax rate competition by low-tax countries. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:146 / 148
页数:3
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