Husserl on analyticity and beyond

被引:1
作者
Haddock, Guillermo E. Rosado [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Puerto Rico, Dept Philosophy, San Juan, PR 00936 USA
关键词
Logical Truth; Skolem Theorem; Abstract Model Theory; Analytic Necessity; Rosado Haddock;
D O I
10.1007/s10743-008-9038-2
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Quine's criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap's notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege's definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl's views, which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.
引用
收藏
页码:131 / 140
页数:10
相关论文
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