The effect of the general anti-avoidance rule on corporate tax avoidance in China

被引：16

作者：

Leung, Sidney C. M. ^{[1
]}

Richardson, Grant ^{[2
]}

Taylor, Grantley ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] City Univ Hong Kong, Coll Business, Dept Accountancy, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[2] Macquarie Univ, Dept Accounting & Corp Governance, Eastern Rd, N Ryde, NSW 2109, Australia

[3] Curtin Univ, Sch Accounting, Curtin Business Sch, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia

来源：

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2019年 / 15卷 / 01期

关键词：

General anti-avoidance rule (GAAR); Corporate tax avoidance; China; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; STATE OWNERSHIP; AGGRESSIVENESS; GOVERNANCE; BOARD; TAXATION; FRAUD; SIZE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcae.2018.12.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines the effect of the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), introduced on January 1, 2008, to enforce corporate tax avoidance laws in China. Based on a sample of 517 Chinese firms over the 2006-2010 period (2585 firm-years), we find a reduction in tax avoidance following the implementation of the GAAR that appears to be the result of the new and stringent tax legislation and the consolidation of Chinese tax law. We also observe that the effects of firms' engaging a Big Four auditor and directors with tax expertise in deterring tax avoidance significantly decreased following implementation of the GAAR. To all intents and purposes, it seems that the implementation of the GAAR in China has moderated the effects of and substituted for these particular monitoring and disciplining mechanisms. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：105 / 117

页数：13

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