Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning

被引:82
作者
Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Plymouth, Sch Psychol, Plymouth PL4 8AA, Devon, England
关键词
Deductive reasoning; New paradigm; Dual-process theory; DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES; COGNITIVE-ABILITY; BELIEF-BIAS; INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES; CAUSAL CONDITIONALS; THINKING BIASES; SELECTION TASK; PROCESS MODELS; MENTAL MODELS; PROBABILITY;
D O I
10.1080/13546783.2011.637674
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
In common with a number of other authors I believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning, specifically the area traditionally labelled as the study of deduction. The deduction paradigm was founded in a philosophical tradition that assumed logicality as the basis for rational thought, and provided binary propositional logic as the agreed normative framework. By contrast, many contemporary authors assume that people have degrees of uncertainty in both premises and conclusions, and reject binary logic as a workable normative system. I discuss a number of questions and challenges for this new psychology of reasoning, including the following: (a) Do we need an alternative normative system, such as Bayesianism, for the new paradigm? (b) Is there any longer a clear distinction between the study of deductive and inductive reasoning, the latter having its own tradition and literature? (c) Precisely how is the integrated study of reasoning and decision making facilitated by the new paradigm? (d) What difficulties with dual-processing approaches need to be resolved, if they are to take us forward?
引用
收藏
页码:5 / 31
页数:27
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