Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory

被引:32
作者
Wang, Chao [1 ]
Guo, Peijun [1 ]
机构
[1] Yokohama Natl Univ, Fac Business Adm, Hodogaya Ku, 79-4 Tokiwadai, Yokohama, Kanagawa 2408501, Japan
关键词
Decision support systems; Behavioral models; Auctions/bidding; One-shot decision theory; Throwing away/overbidding; PRIVATE-VALUE AUCTIONS; SEQUENTIAL PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS; REGRET; 1ST; EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION; BIDDERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2017.03.024
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We build an auction model with the one-shot decision theory which describes the process of a bidder deciding his/her bidding price in first-price sealed-bid auctions. The decision making procedure involves two steps: First, for each of his/her possible bidding prices, the bidder examines every possible highest bidding price provided by the other bidders and chooses one as a focus point of this bidding price of him/her. Then, the bidder determines such a bidding price as the optimal one that generates the best outcome when its focus point occurs. The optimal bidding price can be obtained and two common phenomena in auction markets: throwing away and overbidding are well explained. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:994 / 1000
页数:7
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