State ownership and corporate innovative efficiency

被引:79
作者
Cao, Xiaping [1 ]
Cumming, Douglas [2 ,3 ]
Zhou, Sili [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Shenzhen Univ, Sch Econ, Shenzhen, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Florida Atlantic Univ, Coll Business, Boca Raton, FL 33431 USA
[3] Univ Birmingham, Birmingham Business Sch, Birmingham, W Midlands, England
[4] Fudan Univ, Fanhai Int Sch Finance, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[5] Fudan Univ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
关键词
State ownership; Innovative efficiency; Financial constraints; POLITICAL INSTABILITY; FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; CHINA; PERFORMANCE; PRIVATIZATION; CONNECTIONS; INFORMATION; GOVERNANCE; REFORM;
D O I
10.1016/j.ememar.2020.100699
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In this paper, we investigate the innovative efficiency of SOEs in China. Innovative efficiency refers to output of patents per dollar spending of R&D expenditure. The data indicate that minority SOEs are substantially more innovatively efficient than non-SOEs and majority SOEs. The relative innovative efficiency of minority SOEs is more pronounced among firms with high financial constraints. The data are consistent with the view that, in the Chinese context, there are favorable benefits to partial state ownership through access to talent, connections, and technological resources that enable efficient patent outcomes from R&D expenditure.
引用
收藏
页数:19
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