When can external actors influence democratization? Leverage, linkages, and gatekeeper elites

This article engages in the flourishing debate on the external dimension of democratization by proposing a theoretical model of when external actors can influence democratization. The argument takes its departure in a critical assessment of existing structural contributions. It is argued that structural approaches are useful in explaining interregional differences in external influence, but have difficulties coping with cases that do not adhere to the overall structural pattern - that is, with intraregional differences. To deal with these problems, I turn to Levitsky and Way's renowned framework of leverage and linkage, and argue that their theory, giving primacy to structures, is not entirely valid. The structural determinants (linkages) that constitute the basis of their explanation are not non-amenable as they claim, but can be influenced to a great extent by what I term the gatekeeper elites of the target country. That is, I claim that domestic elites should not only be perceived as mere objects of external influence, as they are in the structural accounts, but rather as gatekeepers that actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors. Hence, to fully understand when external actors can influence democratization, we need to breathe dynamism into the structural accounts by carefully evaluating, not just leverage and linkages, but also elite agency.