Is hiding fair? Exploring consumer resistance to unfairness in opaque pricing

被引:15
作者
Lee, Seul Ki [1 ]
Jang, SooCheong [2 ]
机构
[1] Temple Univ, Sch Tourism & Hospitality Management, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA
[2] Purdue Univ, Sch Hospitality & Tourism Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
关键词
Opaque pricing; Ultimatum Game; Fairness; Distributive justice; Hotel industry; ULTIMATUM; INFORMATION; PERCEPTIONS; DISCRIMINATION; SATISFACTION; STRATEGIES; PUNISHMENT; BEHAVIOR; PRODUCT; UTILITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.12.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The recent emergence of opaque websites and their implications in practice have been studied extensively. However, a less highlighted aspect of this distribution method is that it is a special form of price discrimination. Focusing on this aspect, the current study explores the reactions of potential customers subjected to an unfair situation created by the practice of opaque pricing. By utilizing a variation of the Ultimatum Game, the study found through analysis of variance (ANOVA) that approximately 30% of the respondents were willing to avoid a hotel that may be seen as unfair based on using the opaque method, despite sacrificing transaction value. Additional testing suggests that the results are robust when controlling for gender and familiarity with opaque websites. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed along with the findings of the study. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:434 / 441
页数:8
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