An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games

被引：4

作者：

Beal, Sylvain ^{[1
]}

Remila, Eric ^{[2
]}

Solal, Philippe ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Franche Comte, CRESE, F-25009 Besancon, France

[2] Univ St Etienne, CNRS, UMR 5824, GATE Lyon St Etienne, St Etienne, France

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2013年 / 80卷

关键词：

Accessibility; Core; Optimal bound; Weak dominance; TU-games;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that the core of any n-player TU-game with a non-empty core can be accessed with at most n - 1 blocks. It turns out that this bound is optimal in the sense there are TU-games for which the number of blocks required to access the core is exactly n - 1. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1 / 9

页数：9

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