Competing for endorsements

被引:70
作者
Grossman, GM [1 ]
Helpman, E
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Woodrow Wilson Sch, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Tel Aviv Univ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.89.3.501
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria. (JEL D72).
引用
收藏
页码:501 / 524
页数:24
相关论文
共 23 条
[1]  
Ball Richard, 1995, ECON POLIT-OXFORD, V7, P119
[2]   ELECTORAL COMPETITION WITH INFORMED AND UNINFORMED VOTERS [J].
BARON, DP .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1994, 88 (01) :33-47
[3]  
BERG L, 1996, WHY DONATE NOW PAC
[4]  
CAMERON CM, 1995, UNPUB STRATEGIC ENDO
[5]  
Converse Philip, 1968, GROUP DYNAMICS
[6]   STRATEGIC INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION [J].
CRAWFORD, VP ;
SOBEL, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (06) :1431-1451
[7]  
DONNELLY H, 1980, CQ WEEKLY REPORT, V38, P2277
[8]   WOMEN AT THE 1988 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION [J].
FREEMAN, J .
PS-POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS, 1988, 21 (04) :875-881
[9]  
GERMOND JW, 1997, BALTIMORE SUN 0926, pA21
[10]   EFFICIENT USE OF REFERENCE GROUP CUES IN A SINGLE DIMENSION [J].
GROFMAN, B ;
NORRANDER, B .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 1990, 64 (03) :213-227