International Environmental Agreements with mixed strategies and investment

被引：24

作者：

Hong, Fuhai ^{[2
]}

Karp, Larry ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 96卷 / 9-10期

关键词：

International Environmental Agreement; Climate agreement; Participation game; Investment; Mixed strategy; DISCRETE PUBLIC-GOODS; COALITIONAL STABILITY; POISSON GAMES; PARTICIPATION; COORDINATION; UNCERTAINTY; TECHNOLOGY; PROVISION; TREATIES; ECONOMY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibrium participation and welfare are higher in equilibria that involve higher investment. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：685 / 697

页数：13

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