Evaluating the influencing factors responsible for construction contractors' opportunism in a developing economy

被引:3
作者
Ikuabe, Matthew [1 ]
Oke, Ayodeji [1 ]
Aigbavboa, Clinton [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Johannesburg, Dept Construct Management & Quant Surveying, Johannesburg, South Africa
关键词
opportunism; construction; contractors; project; project performance; ANTECEDENTS; OUTCOMES;
D O I
10.1080/20421338.2020.1746044
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Construction is a very competitive business which often experiences situations in which contractors deploy various schemes to rake in financial proceeds unduly, particularly when the risks encountered do not turn out as favourably as envisaged at inception. This exposes the client of the project to inequitable financial outlays which do not match up with the final end result of the project. This study aimed to assess the factors responsible for construction contractors' opportunism. The study used questionnaires to obtain responses from built environment professionals. A total of three hundred and thirty-seven (337) questionnaires were distributed while a total of two hundred and sixty-four (264) were collected and considered appropriate for analysis. Findings from the study revealed that the major factor influencing contractors' opportunism is 'No statement of work resources in the work schedule', while the various professionals had differing views with respect to the level of occurrence of the factors responsible for contractors' opportunism. Furthermore, the use of factor analysis identified four components which are vagueness, inadequacy, incongruity and impairment which thus serve as the propelling factors of construction contractors' opportunism. The study concluded by stressing the importance of 'contract completeness', as this would go a long way to abating the unwholesome disposition portrayed by construction contractors.
引用
收藏
页码:387 / 393
页数:7
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