Defending the Semantic View: what it takes

被引：8

作者：

Le Bihan, Soazig ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Montana, Dept Philosophy LA 101, Missoula, MT 59812 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2012年 / 2卷 / 03期

关键词：

Models; Semantic View; Scientific theories; Scientific models; Structure; Structuralism; REPRESENTATION; STRUCTURALISM; MODELS;

D O I：

10.1007/s13194-011-0026-6

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

In this paper, a modest version of the Semantic View is motivated as both tenable and potentially fruitful for philosophy of science. An analysis is proposed in which the Semantic View is characterized by three main claims. For each of these claims, a distinction is made between stronger and more modest interpretations. It is argued that the criticisms recently leveled against the Semantic View hold only under the stronger interpretations of these claims. However, if one only commits to the modest interpretation for all the claims, then the view obtained, the Modest Semantic View, is tenable and fruitful for the philosophy of science.

引用

页码：249 / 274

页数：26