Do corporate insiders trade on future stock price crash risk?

被引：37

作者：

He, Guanming ^{[1
]}

Ren, Helen Mengbing ^{[2
]}

Taffler, Richard ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Durham, Business Sch, Durham, England

[2] Univ Liverpool, Management Sch, Liverpool, Merseyside, England

[3] Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Coventry, W Midlands, England

来源：

REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING | 2021年 / 56卷 / 04期

关键词：

Insider selling; Managerial opportunism; Financial constraints; Information asymmetry; SOX; FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; EARNINGS QUALITY; INTERNAL CONTROL; OPTION; MATTER; COSTS; FIRMS; INCENTIVES; GOVERNANCE;

D O I：

10.1007/s11156-020-00936-3

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We explore whether firm managers trade on future stock price crash risk. This depends on managers' ability to assess future crash risk, and on whether the expected payoff is greater than the expected costs associated with potential reputation loss and litigation risk. We find that insider sales are positively associated with future crash risk, which is consistent with managers' trading on crash risk for personal gain. We also find that managers take advantage of high information opacity to pursue crash-risk-based insider sales more aggressively, but are less able to capitalize on this in the case of financial constraints or post-SOX.

引用

页码：1561 / 1591

页数：31

共 76 条

[1] Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains [J].