Academic freedom, private-sector focus, and the process of innovation

被引:197
作者
Aghion, Philippe [1 ]
Dewatripont, Mathias [2 ]
Stein, Jeremy C. [3 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, NBER, CEPR, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Libre Bruxelles, ECARES, Brussels, Belgium
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00031.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. Rather than relying on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research, we emphasize control-rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. At the same time, the private sector's ability to direct scientists toward higher-payoff activities makes it more attractive for later-stage research.
引用
收藏
页码:617 / 635
页数:19
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