ROPMEMU: A Framework for the Analysis of Complex Code-Reuse Attacks

被引:19
作者
Graziano, Mariano [1 ]
Balzarotti, Davide [2 ]
Zidouemba, Alain [1 ]
机构
[1] Cisco Syst Inc, San Jose, CA 95134 USA
[2] Eurecom, Chappes, France
来源
ASIA CCS'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ACM ASIA CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY | 2016年
关键词
D O I
10.1145/2897845.2897894
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Code reuse attacks based on return oriented programming (ROP) are becoming more and more prevalent every year. They started as a way to circumvent operating systems protections against injected code, but they are now also used as a technique to keep the malicious code hidden from detection and analysis systems. This means that while in the past ROP chains were short and simple (and therefore did not require any dedicated tool for their analysis), we recently started to observe very complex algorithms - such as a complete rootkit - implemented entirely as a sequence of ROP gadgets. In this paper, we present a set of techniques to analyze complex code reuse attacks. First, we identify and discuss the main challenges that complicate the reverse engineer of code implemented using ROP. Second, we propose an emulation-based framework to dissect, reconstruct, and simplify ROP chains. Finally, we test our tool on the most complex example available to date: a ROP rootkit containing four separate chains, two of them dynamically generated at runtime.
引用
收藏
页码:47 / 58
页数:12
相关论文
共 50 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], P 2006 IEEE S SEC PR
[2]  
[Anonymous], ENH MIT EXP TOOLK
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2007, P 2007 IEEE S SEC PR
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2009, P 5 WORKSH HOTDEP
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2011, P 6 ACM S INF COMP C, DOI DOI 10.1145/1966913.1966919
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2005, P ANN C USENIX ANN T
[7]  
Bennett-FireEye James T., FIREEYE NUMBER BEAST
[8]  
Bittau A., 2014, P 2014 IEEE S SEC PR
[9]  
Bos H., 2014, SECURITY PRIVACY
[10]  
Buchanan E., 2008, P CCS 2008 OCT