Vertical integration and its implications to port expansion

被引:43
作者
Zhu, Shengda [1 ]
Zheng, Shiyuan [2 ]
Ge, Ying-En [2 ]
Fu, Xiaowen [1 ,3 ]
Sampaio, Breno [4 ]
Jiang, Changmin [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sydney, Inst Transport & Logist Studies, Sydney, NSW, Australia
[2] Shanghai Maritime Univ, Coll Transport & Commun, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Ind & Syst Engn, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Univ Fed Pernambuco, Dept Econ, Recife, PE, Brazil
[5] Univ Manitoba, Asper Sch Business, Winnipeg, MB, Canada
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Port and shipping lines; capacity investment; vertical integration; AIRPORT CAPACITY CHOICE; COMPETITION; TERMINALS; DEMAND; COOPERATION; CONCESSION; CONGESTION; OWNERSHIP; AIRLINES; MARITIME;
D O I
10.1080/03088839.2019.1594426
中图分类号
U [交通运输];
学科分类号
08 ; 0823 ;
摘要
Over the years many shipping lines have established terminal operation companies, with some set up as independent firms. However, port authorities and local governments have not always welcomed external investment and control with open arms. The economic implications and each stakeholder's best strategies remain unclear. This study develops an analytical model in order to study the effects of vertical integration, with a focus on shipping lines' investment in ports' capacity. Modelling results suggest that vertical integration between terminal operator and a shipping line leads to higher port capacity, port charge, market output and consumer surplus. It also reduces delay costs. All these results suggest that vertical integration can be an important source of synergy for the maritime industry. Although vertical integration increases the participating carrier's output at the expenses of non-integrating rival shipping firms, our numerical analysis suggests that the overall social welfare is likely to increase. Preliminary empirical tests confirm that vertically integrated ports handle more traffic volumes and are associated with better infrastructure and equipment. Therefore, port authorities and government regulators should carefully review the market competition status as well as port expansion plans.
引用
收藏
页码:920 / 938
页数:19
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