Boolean Negotiation Games

被引：0

作者：

Bulling, Nils ^{[1
]}

Hindriks, Koen V. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Delft Univ Technol, Delft, Netherlands

来源：

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN DECISION MAKING, COREDEMA 2016 | 2017年 / 10238卷

关键词：

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; AGENTS;

D O I：

10.1007/978-3-319-57285-7_1

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

We propose Boolean Negotiation Games, a computationally grounded model to investigate strategic aspects of negotiations. Our model is inspired by the popular Boolean Game framework and Rubinstein's bargaining model of alternating offers. We analyse restrictions on negotiation protocols and investigate properties of agreements. We propose and investigate protocols that do not allow repeating offers. In the context of Boolean Games we then naturally obtain finite games, which arise in many practical negotiation contexts. We show that Boolean negotiation games (BNGs) can yield agreements which are more beneficial than the stable solutions (i.e. Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game, and propose an algorithm to compute stable negotiation strategies.

引用

页码：1 / 18

页数：18

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