Local False Data Injection Attack Theory Considering Isolation Physical-Protection in Power Systems

被引:13
作者
Fu, Xueqian [1 ]
Chen, Gengrui [1 ]
Yang, Dechnag [1 ]
机构
[1] China Agr Univ, Coll Informat & Elect Engn, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China
关键词
Cyber physical power system; false data injection attack; prosumer energy management; state estimation; STATE ESTIMATION;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2999585
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Cyber security is a matter of the utmost importance in prosumer energy management systems and modern electric power transmission networks. Modern power system is a typical cyber physical system, which is formed by the deep integration of power network and information network. Cyber physical power system has the outstanding advantages of autonomy, reliability, flexibility and efficiency, which give hackers a chance to attack the power systems. Considering the energy distributions and local load redistributions, we propose a local AC false data injection attack model. Both the line power losses, and energy conservation are taken into account in establishing the local false data attack model. Because the state estimation in the actual power system allows some errors, we take the minimum residual in the region as the objective function. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed local false data attack theory are verified in the IEEE 57-bus test case. The simulation results show that the residual error of the injection vector obtained by this attack model is less than 30% compared with that in normal operation.
引用
收藏
页码:103285 / 103290
页数:6
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