Social and strategic imitation: the way to consensus

被引：37

作者：

Vilone, Daniele ^{[1
]}

Ramasco, Jose J. ^{[1
]}

Sanchez, Angel ^{[2
,3
]}

Miguel, Maxi San ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] IFISC CSIC UIB, Palma De Mallorca 07122, Spain

[2] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Matemat, Grp Interdisciplinar Sistemas Complejos GISC, Leganes 28911, Spain

[3] Univ Zaragoza, Inst Biocomputac & Fis Sistemas Complejos BIFI, Zaragoza 50018, Spain

来源：

SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2012年 / 2卷

关键词：

VOTER MODEL; COOPERATION; COMPETITION; ALTRUISM; FAIRNESS; SYSTEMS; IMPACT; GAMES;

D O I：

10.1038/srep00686

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any strategic consideration. We explore here the interplay between strategic and social imitative behavior in a coordination problem on a social network. We observe that for interactions on 1D and 2D lattices any amount of social imitation prevents the freezing of the network in domains with different conventions, thus leading to global consensus. For interactions on complex networks, the interplay of social and strategic imitation also drives the system towards global consensus while neither dynamics alone does. We find an optimum value for the combination of imitative behaviors to reach consensus in a minimum time, and two different dynamical regimes to approach it: exponential when social imitation predominates, power-law when strategic considerations prevail.

引用

页数：7

共 37 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1999, Coordination games

[2]

Blume L, 2003, Int Game Theory Rev, V5, P193, DOI DOI 10.1142/S021919890300101X

[3]

Camerer C.-F., 2003, Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction, DOI DOI 10.1016/J.SOCEC.2003.10.009

[4] Incomplete ordering of the voter model on small-world networks [J].