PAY TO QUIT AND TEAM INCENTIVES

被引：3
作者：
Au, Pak Hung [1 ]
机构：
[1] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2020年 / 18卷 / 02期
关键词：
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; BAD APPLES; PERFORMANCE; TURNOVER; WORKPLACE; COMPENSATION; CONSEQUENCES; SATISFACTION; STRATEGY;
D O I：
10.1093/jeea/jvz011
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of repeated moral hazard. In the optimal contract, the agent may be paid to quit after a poor performance. We show that a generous severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement peer monitoring and sanction among the agents.
引用
收藏
页码：964 / 1008
页数：45
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