Campaign Contributions over CEOs' Careers

被引:41
作者
Fremeth, Adam [1 ]
Richter, Brian Kelleher [2 ]
Schaufele, Brandon [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Western Ontario, Richard Ivey Sch Business, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada
[2] Univ Texas Austin, McCombs Sch Business, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[3] Univ Ottawa, Dept Econ, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada
[4] Univ Ottawa, Inst Environm, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada
关键词
INCENTIVES; CORPORATE; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; POLITICS; MONEY;
D O I
10.1257/app.5.3.170
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Individuals dominate money in politics, accounting for over 90 percent of campaign contributions, yet studies of drivers of individuals' giving are scarce. We analyze data on all contributions made between 1991 and 2008 by all 1,556 people who became S&P 500 CEOs during that interval. We exploit variation in leadership status over these individuals' careers to identify that being an S&P 500 CEO causes a $4,029 or 137 percent jump per election cycle in personal giving. While some fraction of CEOs' contributions can be attributed to long-standing preferences, the striking changes in behavior cannot be explained by these factors alone. (JEL D72, G34)
引用
收藏
页码:170 / 188
页数:19
相关论文
共 49 条
[1]  
Aggarwal RK, 2012, BUS POLIT, V14
[2]   A THEORY OF SOCIAL CUSTOM, OF WHICH UNEMPLOYMENT MAY BE ONE CONSEQUENCE [J].
AKERLOF, GA .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 94 (04) :749-775
[3]  
Andreoni J., 2006, J Public Econ Theory, V8, P1, DOI [10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00250.x, DOI 10.1111/J.1467-9779.2006.00250.X]
[4]  
Angrist JD, 2009, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICISTS COMPANION, P1
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2012, Handbook of Organizational Economics
[6]   Unrepresentative information - The case of newspaper reporting on campaign finance [J].
Ansolabehere, S ;
Snowberg, EC ;
Snyder, JM .
PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 2005, 69 (02) :213-231
[7]   Why is there so little money in US politics? [J].
Ansolabehere, S ;
de Figueiredo, JM ;
Snyder, JM .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 2003, 17 (01) :105-130
[8]   Allocating access for information and contributions [J].
Austen-Smith, D .
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 1998, 14 (02) :277-303
[9]   CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND ACCESS [J].
AUSTENSMITH, D .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1995, 89 (03) :566-581
[10]   Social Incentives in the Workplace [J].
Bandiera, Oriana ;
Barankay, Iwan ;
Rasul, Imran .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2010, 77 (02) :417-458