Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses

被引:60
作者
Jacquet, Laurence [1 ,5 ,6 ]
Lehmann, Etienne [2 ,3 ,7 ]
Van der Linden, Bruno [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, F-95011 Cergy Pontoise, France
[2] Univ Pantheon Assas Paris 2, CRED TEPP, F-75005 Paris, France
[3] CREST INSEE, F-92245 Malakoff, France
[4] Catholic Univ Louvain, IRES, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium
[5] Catholic Univ Louvain, CESifo, Hoover Chair, Louvain, Belgium
[6] Catholic Univ Louvain, CESifo, IRES, Louvain, Belgium
[7] Catholic Univ Louvain, IRES, IDEP, IZA, Louvain, Belgium
关键词
Optimal taxation; Intensive margin; Extensive margin; Marginal tax rates; Random participation; OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION; MARGINAL TAX RATES; LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION; MONOPOLY; WORK;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.019
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study optimal income taxation when labor supply reacts along the intensive and extensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous across two unobserved dimensions: their skill and disutility of participation. We develop a new method to analytically derive conditions under which optimal marginal tax rates are non-negative everywhere. It is typically optimal to provide a distinct level of transfer to the non-employed and to workers with negligible earnings. Numerical simulations illustrate these properties for the US. We also apply our method to sign output distortions in other adverse selection frameworks with random participation, namely the monopoly nonlinear pricing and the regulatory monopoly problems. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:1770 / 1805
页数:36
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