EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS WITH FRICTIONS

被引:5
作者
Camera, Gabriele [1 ,2 ]
Casari, Marco [3 ]
Bigoni, Maria [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Basel, CH-4003 Basel, Switzerland
[2] Chapman Univ, Orange, CA USA
[3] Univ Bologna, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
关键词
Coordination; Cheap-talk; Deception; Indefinitely repeated game; Social norms; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; REPEATED PLAY; FIAT MONEY; COOPERATION; COMMUNICATION; BEHAVIOR; PUNISHMENT; GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONS; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I
10.1111/joes.12018
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Decentralized and impersonal exchange is fundamental to contemporary economies, where many interactions take place among individuals with low levels of information about their counterpart. We review the experimental literature about markets with frictions, where strangers interact in pairs formed at random in economies of indefinite duration. We focus on the impact of communication on the efficiency of the outcome and report results of a new experiment.
引用
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页码:536 / 553
页数:18
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