Creating Self-Sustained Social Norms through Communication and Ostracism

被引:0
作者
Sheremeta, R. M. [1 ]
Tucker, S. J. [1 ]
Zhang, J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Chapman Univ, Argyros Sch Business & Econ, Orange, CA 92866 USA
来源
19TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MODELLING AND SIMULATION (MODSIM2011) | 2011年
关键词
cooperation; free-riding; public goods; communication; ostracism; experiments; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM; PUBLIC-GOODS; EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; COORDINATION FAILURE; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; COOPERATION; GAMES; DESIGN; INSTITUTIONS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
This experimental study compares the effectiveness and efficiency of ostracism and communication on creating and sustaining cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We find that the average contributions decline over time in the baseline VCM. There is a significant increase in the average contributions in the VCM with ostracism, and an even larger increase in the VCM with communication. Communication thus leads to more cooperation, higher efficiency and more equitable payoffs than ostracism. Such effects sustain even in the long run, after we eliminate the opportunity to ostracize or communicate. These findings suggest that social norms can form under the influence of different mechanisms and some mechanisms are better than others at creating and sustaining cooperative norms.
引用
收藏
页码:1428 / 1436
页数:9
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