The article analyzes the polemics of skeptical theists regarding the concept of the multiverse (multiple worlds). The author contends that the concept of the multiverse deserves to be a central focus of the logical argument from evil as well. In fact, this picture of modality - in which modal claims are understood to refer to concrete, spatiotemporally isolated universes - is strikingly similar to a well-known theory of modality: David Lewis' modal realism. The theistic concept of multiple worlds comes from the fact that God created an infinite number of worlds or universes above a certain threshold of good; therefore, the total number of good outweighs the terrible consequences of evil, so the argument from evil does not provide convincing evidence against the existence of God. The aim of the article is to consider various options for the proposed solution of the argument from evil against the almighty God - the concept of multiple worlds in skeptical theism. On reply to the problem of evil, some suggest that God created an infinite number of universes, for example, that God created every universe that contains more good than evil. God does not survey all possible worlds and necessarily actualizes universes in the (on the balance of) good worlds or worthy worlds. For skeptical theists, a weighty argument confirming the possibility of actualization of multiple worlds is the consistency of the conditions of actualization or state of affairs. The dispute between skeptical theists is about the procedure for actualizing a possible universe, which was called the problem of the best of all possible worlds: how God should actually act. It is shown that the argument to the principle of plenitude does not solve the logical problems stemming from attempts to use the theistic concept of the multiverse in discussions about the argument from evil. The author claims that the theistic models of multiple worlds cannot defeat, undermine, or otherwise reduce the evidentiary strength of the argument from evil. The creation of good universes increases the amount of goodness in the world, but the omnipotence of God allows Him to create any number of such universes, which, in turn, leaves open the question whether there is a better world. On the other hand, the fact that there is no better world is not related to the problem of God's omnipotence. Reflections on the good and bad properties of universes and worlds are a kind of a scheme that can be built in various ways depending on the axiologcal and ethical views. The term "axiological threshold" has been studied on the example of approaches of M. Almeida, K. Kraay, T. Guleserian, D. Turner, T. O'Connor and others. The term "axiological threshold" is introduced in order to metaphysically substantiate the solution of the problem of the non-best world.
