Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules

被引:3
作者
Zhou, Yong-Hui [1 ,2 ]
Yu, Jian [3 ]
Xiang, Shu-Wen [3 ]
Wang, Long [1 ]
机构
[1] Peking Univ, Coll Engn, Ctr Syst & Control, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
[2] Guizhou Normal Univ, Sch Math & Comp Sci, Guiyang 550001, Peoples R China
[3] Guizhou Univ, Dept Math, Guiyang 550025, Peoples R China
关键词
Nash equilibrium; Game with endogenous sharing rules; Essential stability; Upper hemicontinuous; Residual set; NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS; NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES; ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS; OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; PURE STRATEGIES; SET;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We prove that essential games with endogenous sharing rules forma dense residual set and that every game with endogenous sharing rules has at least one minimal essential set of solutions. Furthermore,we establish that essential continuous games form a dense residual set and that every continuous game has at least one minimal essential set of Nash equilibria. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:233 / 240
页数:8
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