REIT Liquidity Management and Institutional Investors

被引:0
作者
An, Heng [1 ]
Wu, Qun [2 ]
Zhang, Ting [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ North Carolina Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402 USA
[2] Univ Nevada, Reno, NV 89557 USA
[3] Univ Dayton, Dayton, OH 45469 USA
关键词
ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; RISK; PERFORMANCE; PREFERENCES; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine how institutional investors influence the liquidity choice between cash versus bank credit lines of real estate investment trusts (REITs). While cash offers REIT managers unconditional control rights, credit lines subject managers to bank monitoring. We find that REITs use more bank credit lines relative to cash under the oversight of institutional investors, especially independent and long-term institutions. These findings suggest that institutional investors attenuate the REIT managers' propensity to keep excessive cash relative to credit lines. Moreover, institutional investors delegate more agency monitoring to banks when their holding REITs are more risky and have more severe agency problems.
引用
收藏
页码:539 / 567
页数:29
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