When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?

被引：8

作者：

Morton, Justin ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA

来源：

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2019年 / 97卷 / 02期

关键词：

evolutionary debunking argument; moral realism; third-factor response; naturalism; beg the question;

D O I：

10.1080/00048402.2018.1455718

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Some proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what's wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to remain undebunked.

引用

页码：265 / 280

页数：16