Does monitoring affect corruption? Career concerns and home bias in football refereeing

被引：14

作者：

Rocha, Bruno ^{[1
]}

Sanches, Fabio ^{[2
]}

Souza, Igor ^{[3
,4
]}

Domingos da Silva, Jose Carlos ^{[5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Fed Minas Gerais, Dept Econ & Cedeplar, BR-31270901 Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil

[2] London Sch Econ, Dept Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England

[3] Univ Fed Ouro Preto, Dept Econ, Mariana, Brazil

[4] UFMG, Mariana, Brazil

[5] FECAP, Dept Econ, Sao Paulo, Brazil

[6] PUC SP, Sao Paulo, Brazil

来源：

APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2013年 / 20卷 / 08期

关键词：

social pressure; referee bias; sports economics; D03; D73; L83; FAVORITISM;

D O I：

10.1080/13504851.2012.736938

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article evaluates refereeing bias in football games. Using a data set for Brazilian Championship, we find that referees systematically favour home teams setting more extra time in close matches in which home teams are behind. Career concerns seem to be relevant, since monitoring inhibits this behaviour and the effect of the refereeing bias on the probability of scoring in the extra time is quantitatively negligible.

引用

页码：728 / 731

页数：4

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