Conditional corruption

被引:99
作者
Dong, Bin [2 ]
Dulleck, Uwe [1 ]
Torgler, Benno [1 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Queensland Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Finance, Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia
[2] Southeast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Nanjing 210096, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[3] CREMA, CH-4052 Basel, Switzerland
[4] CESifo, D-81679 Munich, Germany
关键词
Corruption; Contagion effect; Conditional cooperation; Interdependent preferences; TAX MORALE; ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS; PERSISTENCE; PREFERENCES; COMPETITION; ALLOCATION; COUNTRIES; ATTITUDES; CUSTOM; GENDER;
D O I
10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper we discuss whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We use the notion of "conditional corruption" for these effects. We analyze whether the justifiability to be corrupt is influenced by the perceived activities of others. Moreover, we also explore whether - and to what extent - group dynamics or socialization and past experiences affect corruption. We present evidence using two data sets at the micro level and a large macro level international panel data set. The results indicate that the willingness to engage in corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro level indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current corruption level. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:609 / 627
页数:19
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