On the evasion of employment protection legislation

被引：2

作者：

Baumann, Florian ^{[2
]}

Friehe, Tim ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Konstanz, Dept Econ, D-78457 Constance, Germany

[2] Univ Tubingen, Fac Econ & Social Sci, D-72074 Tubingen, Germany

来源：

LABOUR ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 19卷 / 01期

关键词：

Evasion; Employment protection; Dismissal regulations; Heterogeneous workers; ENFORCEMENT; CONTRACTS; LAW;

D O I：

10.1016/j.labeco.2011.06.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzes how the option to evade employment protection legislation impacts on unemployment. Using a stylized model, it is established that the level of unemployment is non-monotonous in the degree of strictness with which employment protection legislation is enforced. Considering just cause and social criteria requirements for three regulatory regimes representative of a large number of industrialized countries, we find that different regimes generate different dismissal decisions only if the regimes are strictly enforced. In contrast, unemployment rates may differ across regimes even in the case of weak enforcement. Additionally, we find that it may be worse for the economy to weakly enforce harmful regulations than to strictly enforce them. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：9 / 17

页数：9