Understanding the hold-up problem in the management of megaprojects: The case of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project

被引:35
作者
Chang, Chen-Yu [1 ]
机构
[1] UCL, Bartlett Sch Construct & Project Management, London WC1E 7HP, England
关键词
Transaction cost economics; Hold-up; Quasi-rent; Private finance initiative; Renegotiation; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; RENEGOTIATION DESIGN; CORPORATE-FINANCE; CONTRACTS; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijproman.2012.10.012
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This research examines the outcome of renegotiations that happened between the UK government and private investors in the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project and develops a model to formalise the evolution of bargaining power of these two parties in the contracting period. This model makes two novel contributions in the development of theoretical understanding to hold-up problems for project management: (1) the effect of financial arrangement on bargaining power balance is quantitatively examined; and (2) the relationship between bargaining power and quasi-rent is established through the application of the Nash bargaining model. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:628 / 637
页数:10
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