Malicious code on Java']Java Card smartcards: Attacks and countermeasures

被引:0
作者
Mostowski, Wojciech [1 ]
Poll, Erik [1 ]
机构
[1] Radboud Univ Nijmegen, Dept Comp Sci, Digital Secur DS Grp, NL-6525 ED Nijmegen, Netherlands
来源
SMART CARD RESEARCH AND ADVANCED APPLICATIONS, PROCEEDINGS | 2008年 / 5189卷
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
When it comes to security, an interesting difference between Java Card and regular Java is the absence of an on-card bytecode verifier on most Java Cards. In principle this opens up the possibility of malicious, ill-typed code as an avenue of attack, though the Java Card platform offers SOME: protection against this, notably by code signing. This paper gives an extensive overview of vulnerabilities and possible runtime countermeasures against ill-typed code, and describes results of experiments with attacking actual Java Cards currently on the market with malicious code.
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页码:1 / 16
页数:16
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