Does managerial ability facilitate corporate innovative success?

被引:151
作者
Chen, Yangyang [1 ,2 ]
Podolski, Edward J. [3 ]
Veeraraghavan, Madhu [4 ]
机构
[1] Monash Univ, Dept Banking & Finance, Clayton, Vic 3800, Australia
[2] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] La Trobe Univ, Dept Finance, Bundoora, Vic 3086, Australia
[4] TA PAI Management Inst, Finance Area, Manipal 576104, Karnataka, India
关键词
Managerial ability; Corporate innovation; Patents; Citations; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CEO OVERCONFIDENCE; AGENCY COSTS; PERFORMANCE; PAY; INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT; REPUTATION; OWNERSHIP; VALUATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jempfin.2015.08.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines whether managerial ability facilitates corporate innovative success. First, we show that managerial ability is positively associated with innovative output. Second, we show that the positive association between managerial ability and innovative output is weaker for older CEOs and managers who stay in the same job for longer, suggesting a preference for a 'quiet life' by long serving CEOs. Third, we find that the equity market values patents generated by more able managers more positively, suggesting that equity holders deem better skilled managers more effective at converting innovative ideas into valuable new products. Finally, we show that managerial ability is positively associated with more 'radical' innovations, which are outside of the firm's knowledge base. Overall, our results suggest that managerial ability is an essential component of corporate innovative success. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:313 / 326
页数:14
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