On games without approximate equilibria

被引：1
|
作者：
Levy, Yehuda John [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Glasgow, Adam Smith Business Sch, Glasgow, Lanark, Scotland
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2020年 / 49卷 / 04期
关键词：
Approximate equilibrium; Bayesian games; Discontinuous games;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-020-00734-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This note shows that the work by Simon and Tomkowicz (Israel J Math 227(1):215-231, 2018) answers another outstanding open question in game theory in addition to the non-existence of approximate Harsanyi equilibrium in Bayesian games: it shows that strategic form games with bounded and separately continuous payoffs need not possess approximate equilibria.
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页码：1125 / 1128
页数：4
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