On games without approximate equilibria

被引:1
|
作者
Levy, Yehuda John [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Glasgow, Adam Smith Business Sch, Glasgow, Lanark, Scotland
关键词
Approximate equilibrium; Bayesian games; Discontinuous games;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-020-00734-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This note shows that the work by Simon and Tomkowicz (Israel J Math 227(1):215-231, 2018) answers another outstanding open question in game theory in addition to the non-existence of approximate Harsanyi equilibrium in Bayesian games: it shows that strategic form games with bounded and separately continuous payoffs need not possess approximate equilibria.
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页码:1125 / 1128
页数:4
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