On "Epistemic Permissiveness"

被引:20
作者
Brueckner, Anthony [1 ]
Bundy, Alex [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
关键词
Epistemology; Rationality; Permissiveness; Uniqueness; Roger White;
D O I
10.1007/s11229-011-9921-9
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
In "Epistemic Permissiveness", Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one's total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe similar to P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White's arguments and then argue that they do not succeed.
引用
收藏
页码:165 / 177
页数:13
相关论文
共 4 条
[1]  
BonJour L., 1985, The structure of empirical knowledge
[2]   Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy [J].
Christensen, David .
PHILOSOPHY COMPASS, 2009, 4 (05) :756-767
[3]  
Harman G., 1999, Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind
[4]  
White R, 2005, NOUS, P445