LOCATION CHOICE AND PATENT LICENSING

被引：1

作者：

Lin, Yan-Shu ^{[1
]}

Hu, Jin-Li ^{[2
]}

Xia, Peng-Chiao ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Dong Hwa Univ, Hualien, Taiwan

[2] Natl Chiao Tung Univ, Inst Business & Management, Hsinchu, Taiwan

来源：

MANCHESTER SCHOOL | 2013年 / 81卷 / 02期

关键词：

SPATIAL PRICE-DISCRIMINATION; WELFARE; COMPETITION; LITIGATION; INNOVATION; OUTPUT; FEE;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02271.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the patent licensing decision when firms can endogenously choose their locations. If the insider patentee is the location leader, the royalty is not necessarily the best method of licensing. No licensing can be the best method for an insider patentee with a sufficiently high degree of innovation, but fixed-fee is always the worst. However, if the non-innovating firm is the location leader, the royalty licensing is always the best method; moreover, the fixed-fee licensing (no licensing) is the second best method if the degree of innovation is relatively small (sufficiently large).

引用

页码：121 / 142

页数：22

共 22 条

[1] Time factors of patent litigation and licensing [J].