Corruption, decentralization and yardstick competition

被引：19

作者：

Dincer, Oguzhan C. ^{[2
]}

Ellis, Christopher J. ^{[1
]}

Waddell, Glen R. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oregon, Dept Econ, Eugene, OR 97403 USA

[2] Illinois State Univ, Dept Econ, Normal, IL 61790 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE | 2010年 / 11卷 / 03期

关键词：

Corruption; Decentralization; Yardstick competition; Spatial autoregression; BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION; TAX MIMICKING; GROWTH;

D O I：

10.1007/s10101-009-0067-x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states, we also provide new evidence that points to the existence of a spatial autoregressive component to explaining corruption. We interpret this as consistent with the theoretical findings.

引用

页码：269 / 294

页数：26

共 28 条

[1]

Allen R.G., 1998, FAO Irrigation and Drainage Paper 56

[2] Tax mimicking and yardstick competition among local governments in the Netherlands [J].