Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution

被引:33
作者
Hoechtl, Wolfgang [1 ]
Sausgruber, Rupert [1 ]
Tyran, Jean-Robert [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Econ & Stat, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
[2] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
[3] Univ Copenhagen, Dept Econ, DK-1353 Copenhagen, Denmark
基金
奥地利科学基金会;
关键词
Redistribution; Self interest; Inequality aversion; Median voter; Experiment; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; SELF-INTEREST; FAIRNESS; EFFICIENCY; ACCOUNT; LABOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the "rich" are in majority. With a "poor" majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1406 / 1421
页数:16
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