The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

被引:5
作者
Kumabe, Masahiro [2 ]
Mihara, H. Reiju [1 ]
机构
[1] Kagawa Univ, Grad Sch Management, Takamatsu, Kagawa 7608523, Japan
[2] Univ Air, Kanagawa Study Ctr, Minami Ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa 2320061, Japan
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s00355-008-0300-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.
引用
收藏
页码:621 / 640
页数:20
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