Coordination of VMI supply chain with replenishment tactic under risk aversion and sales effort
被引:3
作者:
Liu, Jing
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机构:
Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Sch Automobile & Traff Engn, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R ChinaHubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Liu, Jing
[1
,2
]
Huang, Fuyou
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Inst Transportat Dev Strategy & Planning Sichuan, Chengdu 610041, Peoples R ChinaHubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Huang, Fuyou
[3
]
Ma, Chao
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Sch Automobile & Traff Engn, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R ChinaHubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Ma, Chao
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
[2] Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Sch Automobile & Traff Engn, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
[3] Inst Transportat Dev Strategy & Planning Sichuan, Chengdu 610041, Peoples R China
来源:
4OR-A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
|
2021年
/
19卷
/
03期
This paper considers a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) supply chain consisting of a risk-averse supplier and a risk-neutral retailer engaging in sales promoting efforts. Under the conditional risk at value, we examine three different types of contracts with the replenishment option for coordinating the VMI supply chain, namely, a risk diversification and cost sharing (RDCS) contract, an option and cost sharing contract, and a subsidy and cost sharing contract. Firstly, we derive the optimal production strategy and analyze the capability of each of the proposed contracts in coordinating the VMI supply chain. We find that all of those contracts can achieve coordination of the supply chain with Pareto improvement. Secondly, we also show that both the supplier and the retailer prefer the RDCS contract over the other two contracts. Finally, we use numerical experiments to analyze the impact of risk aversion on contracts' parameters.