Room assignment-rent division:: A market approach

被引：31
作者：
Abdulkadiroglu, A [1 ]
Sönmez, T
Ünver, MU
机构：
[1] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Koc Univ, Dept Econ, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey
来源：
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2004年 / 22卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.
引用
收藏
页码：515 / 538
页数：24
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