Room assignment-rent division:: A market approach

被引：31

作者：

Abdulkadiroglu, A ^{[1
]}

Sönmez, T

Ünver, MU

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10027 USA

[2] Koc Univ, Dept Econ, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2004年 / 22卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

引用

页码：515 / 538

页数：24

共 18 条

[1] FAIR ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND CRITERIA OF JUSTICE [J].