Evolutionary Game Model of Public Opinion Information Propagation in Online Social Networks

被引:35
作者
Wang, Jiakun [1 ]
Wang, Xinhua [1 ]
Fu, Li [1 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Econ & Management, Qingdao 266500, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Online social networks; public opinion information; propagation; evolutionary game theory; management strategy; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3006150
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The rapid development of communication technology has greatly changed the way of information propagation. While making use of positive public opinion information in online social networks (OSN) to create value, it is necessary to manage and control the propagation of public opinion. Considering the existence of both positive and negative public opinion, we proposed a tripartite evolutionary game model through identifying the relevant stakeholders involved in the public opinion spreading process, discussed the equilibrium conditions of stakeholders' behavior strategies emphatically and carried out simulation experiments. Then, based on the experimental results, the management strategy and the key intervention points of public opinion spreading were proposed. The result shows that the key to management and control public opinion is realizing the interest balance of all stakeholders. That is, the government should increase the benefits of netizens and media spreading (reporting) positive public opinion, and at the same time strengthen the punishment of them spreading (reporting) negative public opinion. This paper further expands the research of public opinion propagation in OSN, and provides theoretical support and decision-making basis for the management and control of public opinion.
引用
收藏
页码:127732 / 127747
页数:16
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